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 The development of Theory of Capital Structure （CST）over the period of 
Traditional CST，the period of Modern CST，as well as the period of New CST, has 
made tremendous contributions to the enrichment of economic theories and financial 
practice. Beneficial as it is，the CST mainstream is deficient in its ignorance of 
connections between enterprises and their stakeholders in the real society. It regards 
financial activities in an isolated perspective，which is called ‘under-socialization’. 
This deficiency renders CST imperfect in explaining financial decisions by enterprises 
in connection-characterized background ， especially in a society with 
political-connection dominance.  
 By introducing ‘Political Connections’ （PCs） into capital structure model，this 
paper aims at insights into the influence of PCs，non-government-ownership PCs in 
particular，in capital structure. With three hypotheses tested，this paper delivers three 
conclusions：First，PCs have positive effects on debt financing，which implies that a 
politically-connected firms can finance more debts than less political-connected ones，
thus have a higher leverage. Second，‘Tax Investments in PCs’ ① generates benefits in 
improving financing capabilities. Third，the impact of PCs and ‘Tax Investments in 
PCs’ on capital structure lies in its improvement of short-term debt financing ability. It 
means that a firm with stronger PCs and more Tax Investments in PCs may have a 
higher short-term debt ratio and a more elasticity-oriented capital structure. 
 Based on the empirical evidence from Chinese family enterprises, the author 
points out that PCs are a destined outcome of defective property and law systems, as 
well as under-developed financial markets. In such an economy as China, PCs serve 
as an effective non-structural factor, complementing the structural system in resource 
allocation, through information-delivering mechanism，trust mechanism, friendship 
mechanism and political activities, etc.  
                                                        
① In the regression with ‘Time Investments in PCs’ and ‘Tax Investments in PCs’ as the independent variables, and 
‘Total Debt/Total Assets’ as the dependent variable, ‘Tax Investments in PCs’ reveals a significant  positive 
impact on the debt financing capabilities of Chinese family enterprises; while the coefficient of ‘Time Investments 
in PCs’ is also positive, it is insignificant. Empirical results and analysis are detailed in Chapter 5. Definition and 














Given PCs’ important role in financing enhancement, the author proposes certain 
‘Tax Investments in PCs’ by the majority of non-government-owned firms in China. 
 



































目    录 
第一章 引言 ........................................................................................1 
第一节  研究目的与动机..............................................................................1 
第二节  研究思路与框架..............................................................................2 
第二章 文献评述................................................................................4 
第一节  资本结构..........................................................................................4 
第二节  政治关系........................................................................................13 
第三节  政治关系与资本结构....................................................................21 
第三章 我国政治关系的制度背景分析 .........................................26 
第一节  我国的“大财政”与“小金融”................................................26 
第二节  产权性政治关系理论在我国的适用性........................................29 
第三节  非产权性政治关系理论在我国的适用性....................................30 
第四章 实证研究设计......................................................................36 
第一节  样本选取与数据来源....................................................................36 
第二节  变量定义与测度............................................................................37 
第三节  假设的提出....................................................................................42 
第四节  模型的建立....................................................................................44 
第五章 实证检验与结果分析..........................................................45 
第一节  主要变量的描述性统计................................................................45 
第二节  实证结果分析................................................................................46 
第六章 结论与讨论..........................................................................49 
第一节     结论................................................................................................49 
第二节  本文的局限及后续研究方向........................................................50 
参考文献 … ............................................................................................52 















Chapter 1 Introduction ..........................................................................1 
Section 1  Motives of the research.......................................................................1 
Section 2  Research Method and Framework ......................................................2 
Chapter 2  Literature Review................................................................4 
Section 1  Capital Structure .................................................................................4 
Section 2  Political Connections ........................................................................13 
Section 3  Political Connections and Capital Structure .....................................21 
Chapter3 Institutional Background...................................................26 
Section 1  ‘Big Public Finance’ and ‘Small Banking’ in China.........................26 
Section 2 Applicability of Government-Property Political Connections in 
Chinese Background ........................................................................29 
Section 3  Applicability of Non-Government-Property Political Connections in 
Chinese Background ........................................................................30 
Chapter 4  Research Design.................................................................36 
Section 1  Sample and Data Sources..................................................................36 
Section 2  Definition and Measurement of Variables ........................................37 
Section 3  Hypotheses........................................................................................42 
Section 4  Models...............................................................................................44 
Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Analysis ........................................45 
Section 1  Descriptive Statistics.........................................................................45 
Section 2  Regression Analysis ..........................................................................46 
Chapter 6  Conclusions and Discussions ............................................49 
Section 1  Conclusions.......................................................................................49 




























































































































图 1.2.1 简要地概括了本文的研究思路与框架： 
 
图 1.2.1:  本文的研究思路与框架 
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第五章  实证检验与结果分析 



































资本结构理论阶段始于 20 世纪 70 年代后期，包括资本结构的代理成本理论、财







传统资本结构理论学派以 Williams、Graham、Gordon、Braham 和 Weston 等



























MM 定理。MM 定理在严格的假设条件②下证明了“无关论”——定理 1③指出，
在完美的市场条件下，“企业的市场价值与其资本结构无关，它由未来预期收入
按所处等级折现率折现得到”，即 “公司的平均资本成本完全不受资本结构的影
响，而等于公司未来净权益流的资本化率”。定理 2④在定理 1 的基础上指出，“（拥
有负债和权益的企业）每股预期收益等于相应等级（ k 等级）无负债企业的资本
化率 kρ ，加上一个风险溢酬，该风险溢酬为债务权益比与其预期收益相应等级
无负债企业的资本化率 kρ 和债务利息率 r 之差的乘积”。定理 3
⑤认为“如果 k 等
级的公司以公司股东的利益 大化作为决策的出发点，那么，当且仅当投资收益
率 *ρ 大于或者等于 kρ ，这一投资机会方可采用。即所有该等级公司进行投资决
策的临界点都为 kρ ，投资项目的取舍不受为其融资所采取的证券类型的影响”。 
Kraus 和 Litzenberger（1973）鉴于现实条件中“对公司利润的课税制度”和
                                                        




益的某一等级”，同等级的所有公司的股票收益应“完美相关”。Modigliani and Miller（1958），“The Cost of 
Capital, Corporation Finance and Theory of Investment”[J].The American Economic Review，Vol.48，No.3，
pp.261-297. 
③ Modigliani and Miller（1958），“The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and Theory of Investment”[J].The 
American Economic Review，Vol.48，No.3，pp.268. 
④ Modigliani and Miller（1958），“The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and Theory of Investment”[J].The 
American Economic Review， Vol.48，No.3，pp.271. 
⑤ Modigliani and Miller（1958），“The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and Theory of Investment”[J].The 







































③“经验破产成本主义”以 Altman 和 Warner 为代表，主要对破产成本④进行量化
                                                        
① 沈艺峰，《资本结构理论史》[M]，经济科学出版社，1999，第 58 页。 





照苛刻条款方能获得信贷和发行证券的可能性。Warner（1977），“Bankruptcy Cost: Some Evidence”， The The 































Scott、Kraus 和 Litzenberger 等学者承接两大学派的研究成果，提出了资本结构
权衡理论，认为企业的资本结构决策实际上是对债务和非债务税收利益以及破产










                                                        
① Warner（1977），“Bankruptcy Cost: Some Evidence”， The The Journal of Finance， Vol. 32，No.2，pp.338. 
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